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SOMETIMES AN IMPACT FEE IS NOT JUST AN IMPACT
FEE: THE POSSIBLE INEQUITABLE APPLICATION OF
HAWAII'S IMPACT FEE STATUTE TO FOREIGN
INVESTORS
Jose F. Vera
Abstract. Historically, Hawaii has assessed foreign developers high impact fees
either as a means to raise capital for affordable housing or as a means to regulate foreign
investment. In 1992, Hawaii enacted House Bill 3787, an impact fee statute, to promote
uniformity in Hawaii's assessments of impact fees. Although Hawaii's statute provides
uniformity for most developers, it still permits local governments to assess foreign
developers disproportionately higher impact fees. This Comment examines how a
foreign developer might challenge either Hawaii's impact fee statute or an individual
impact fee assessment as violating his or her constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This Comment further argues that assessing
foreign developers high impact fees either as a means to pay for affordable housing or as
a means to regulate foreign investment is a bad policy choice in light of Hawaii's general
need for investment
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the Hawaii State Legislature enacted House Bill 3787, its
first uniform impact fee statute.1 Impact fee statutes require developers to
pay a portion of the cost for those infrastructure improvements that are
required to support a developer's new development. 2 Correspondingly,
impact fee statutes limit local governments to using the money collected
from these fees to offset the cost of only those infrastructure improvements
required by the developer's new development. In this way, those who
benefit from the improved services, the developers, pay a portion of the cost
for infrastructure improvements, like new roads, power and sewer services.
Prior to the passage of House Bill 3787, Hawaii's local governments
assessed impact fees in an ad hoc manner, occasionally assessing foreign
nationals disproportionately high impact fees.3 House Bill 3787 was in-
I See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 61-88 and accompanying text
3 See infra notes 61-88 and accompanying text.
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tended to standardize Hawaii's impact fee rates and to increase the certainty
of development costs for developers.4
However, instead of standardizing impact fees for all developers,
House Bill 3787 still permits local governments to assess foreign develop-
ers disproportionately high fees. Such assessments are problematic for two
reasons. First, the State of Hawaii may be creating a disincentive for
foreign investment by assessing foreign national developers higher impact
fees, thereby diverting foreign investment away from Hawaii. Second,
assessing higher fees against foreign developers on the basis of nationality
may be unconstitutional. Hawaii's use of impact fees also illustrates an
underlying tension faced by local governments. Namely, local governments
must respond to the demands of its citizens. Yet at the same time, local
governments must also attempt to accommodate global market forces that
merge disparate cultures, and that financially sanction those governments
that reduce the profitability for international investors. This Comment ex-
amines these legal and policy issues in three parts.
Part II discusses how impact fees affect development and why
changes in Hawaii's investor profile will exacerbate the effect of high
impact fees on international investment. This part addresses the specific
problems created when local governments assess foreign national develop-
ers higher impact fees than national or local developers. Part II then
discusses the factors motivating Hawaii's municipal and county govern-
ments to assess foreign nationals higher impact fees. Finally, it discusses
how these assessments tend to affect foreign investment and why the
change from predominately Japanese investors to Chinese investors in
Hawaii exacerbates the effect of high impact fee assessments on
international investment.
Part III examines the legal issues raised by inequitably assessing
foreign nationals higher impact fees. For practical purposes, this section
explores the ways an international investor may challenge an inequitable
impact fee assessment. The section specifically focuses on two legal issues.
First is whether a foreign national developer has constitutional standing
when claiming that an impact fee 'statute or an individual impact fee
assessment violates the developer's constitutional rights. Next, after con-
4 See JAMES C. NICHOLAS & DAN DAVIDSON, IMPACT FEES IN HAWAII: IMPLEMENTING THE STATE
LAW I (1992); see also Mari Taketa, The Jaded Yen: After Years of Heated Courtship, Japanese Tourists
and Investors Are Snubbing Hawaii, HAWAII BUSINESS, June 1991, § 1, at 30, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, ASAPII File.
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cluding that all but non-resident property owning foreign nationals have
constitutional standing to challenge an impact fee statute or an impact fee
assessment, the second issue is whether assessing foreign national develop-
ers higher impact fees as a pre-condition to granting development permits
violates the foreign national developer's equal protection rights.
Part IV discusses why Hawaii's local governments should not assess
foreign national developers disproportionately high impact fees. It
concludes by arguing that Hawaii should not misuse the statute's fee provi-
sions to address problems other than equitably funding new infrastructure
improvements. Likewise, Hawaii should not use collected fees to pay for
Hawaii's affordable housing needs unless the assessed development creates
a need for affordable housing, nor should Hawaii assess disproportionately
high impact fees as a backhanded means of regulating foreign investment.
Such impact fee assessments are constitutionally questionable and, because
they tend to discourage foreign investment in Hawaii, they are unsound
policy. Finally, part IV concludes by noting that the issues raised by
Hawaii's impact fee statute represent the difficulties faced by local govern-
ments attempting to address needs of their citizens while simultaneously
integrating with the new global economy.
II. IMPACT FEES IN HAWAII
A. The Historical Development of Hawaii's Impact Fee Statute
In 1990, a Japanese golf course developer agreed to pay an $111
million impact fee for a recently completed golf course and further agreed
to pay $200 million in community impact fees for permission to build two
more Oahu golf courses.5 The local government's requirement of paying a
$100 million impact fee as a pre-condition to granting a golf course
development permit reflects the ad hoc manner in which Hawaiian govern-
ments assessed impact fees prior to the enactment of House Bill 3787.
Moreover, such impact fee assessments support the inference that suspect
factors motivate Hawaii's impact fee assessments because before Japanese
investors constituted the bulk of Hawaiian golf course development permit
5 Hawaiian Officials Seek Slice of State's Golf Course Boom, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 5, 1990,
at 2G.
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applicants, Hawaiian golf course impact fees were much lower than $100
million; they ranged around several million dollars.6
To all developers, these potentially burdensome impact fee assess-
ments, combined with restrictive land-use regulations, sent an implicit
message that new development was not welcome in Hawaii.7 The un-
certainty associated with such burdensome impact fee assessments and
restrictive land-use regulations created an untenable risk for developers.8
To resolve the uncertainty created by such land-use regulations,
Hawaii's legislature enacted House Bill 3787.9 The bill creates uniform
impact fee rates for local developers by specifically detailing how impact
fee rates are to be determined. However, the bill still allows Hawaii's local
governments to assess foreign developers higher impact fees than those
charged to local developers for similar types of developments. While there
could be a rational basis for charging foreign national developers higher
impact fees for some developments, this Comment focuses on inequitable
impact fee assessments allowed by House Bill 3787 towards foreign
developers. This problem is best exemplified by Hawaii's short lived $100
million golf course impact fee.
B. The Effect of High Impact Fee Assessments on International
Investment
Assessing foreign nationals higher impact fees will tend to discourage
foreign investment. To Hawaii, the loss of foreign investment will impact
the Hawaiian economy, as foreign investors now own over half of down-
town Honolulu's office space, about sixty-six percent of the state's hotel
rooms, and almost nine percent. of the state's agricultural land. 10 These
numbers indicate the significant role foreign investment plays in the
Hawaiian economy. These numbers also implicitly suggest that a reduction
in foreign investment will have a negative economic impact if Hawaii
experiences a loss of investment capital in these sectors of its economy.
Thus, in considering how impact fees affect development, it is important to
6 DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE 45 (1994).
7 Taketa, supra note 4, at 30.
8 ld
9 See NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 4, at 1.
10 James Mak & Marcia Y. Sakai, "Is foreign investment good or bad for Hawaii?", in THE PRICE
OF PARADISE 34 (Randall Roth ed., 1992).
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examine how assessing foreign nationals higher impact fees will affect
foreign investment in Hawaii.
Foreign investment is likely to decrease if local Hawaiian govern-
ments are permitted to assess foreign national developers disproportionately
high impact fees. To foreign investors large impact fees endanger their in-
vestment's profitability." The threat posed by Hawaii's land-use controls
and by the mere possibility of disproportionately high impact fees caused at
least two longtime Japanese investors to move their new investments to
cheaper, less threatening markets. 12 The commercial real estate firm
Monroe & Friedlander reported through its president, Andy Friedlander,
that its Japanese clients were turning their attention to the markets in Hong
Kong, Europe, and the mainland United States.' 3 Likewise, Walter Dods
Jr., chairman and CEO of First Hawaiian Bank and Hawaii chairman of the
Japan-Hawaii Economic Council, noted that "major Japanese corporations
with investments in Hawaii were considering investing major dollars out-
side" of Hawaii where they might feel more welcome. 14 Thus, the question
of how high impact fees affects foreign investment is answered by the
investors themselves. High impact fees, which contribute to high develop-
ment costs, discourages foreign investment and causes them to invest in
other more profitable markets.
C. The Factors Behind the Assessment of Hawaii's Impact Fees
Two major factors influenced the historical tendency of Hawaii's
local governments to assess foreign nationals disproportionately high
impact fees: (1) Hawaii's lack of affordable housing, and (2) Hawaii's con-
cern with large scale foreign investment. The problem for foreign investors,
however, is that there is no indication that these concerns have disappeared
from the islands. If these factors are still present, they may motivate
Hawaii's local governments to continue assessing foreign national develop-
ers disproportionately high impact fees.
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Hawaii's lack of affordable housing has directly affected Hawaii's
use of impact fees.15 Hawaii, by its own count, "has the most severe
homeless problem in the United States." Hawaii spends approximately $15
per capita on the homeless as compared to the mainland which spends
approximately $4 per capita.16 Hawaiian officials "estimate that 64,000
affordable homes need to be built by the year 2000."17 To meet this goal,
Hawaii required developers to buy or pay for new units.s Hawaii's acute
housing shortage was one factor that led Governor John Waihee and
Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi to support a $100 million impact fee for golf
course development permits to raise money to pay for affordable housing. 19
The public's fear of economic colonization served as an additional
motivation for Mayor Fasi and Governor Waihee to propose a $100 million
impact fee on each new golf course.20 Many Hawaiians blamed Japanese
investment for the housing shortage and for the escalation of housing
prices. 21 Hawaii's lack of affordable housing caused local residents to feel
that their opportunity for home ownership was threatened by foreign inves-
tors and thereby generated political pressure to slow foreign investment.22
15 John Woestendiek, Hawaii finally begins to tackle growing problem of homeless, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 10, 1991, at A18, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, HCHRN File; see also David Tong,
Trouble in Paradise: Home Prices Scaring Hawaiians Away, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1990, at h02.
16 The seriousness of Hawaii's housing problem is evident from the words spoken by Glenn Kaya,
CEO of $87 million Gem of Hawaii:
It's not just an issue of affordable homes, the homeless and the children who must move in with
their parents[sic]. The banks must adjust their loan ratios. The state must create more Kakaakos
where variance has become the rule and not the exception. The exodus of the competent young,
the drain of the good work force to the mainland because they can buy a home for less than half
the cost in Hawaii, are all facts and everyday occurrences.
Diane Chang, Supply in Demand HAWAII BuSINESS, Jan. 1992, § 1, at 17, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, ASAPII File.
17 Tong, supra note 15, at h02.
18 Id
19 See Hawaiian Officials Seek Slice of State's Golf Course Boom, supra note 5, at 2G (reporting the
idea of charging golf course developers a "community impact fee" to pay for rental housing has drawn the
support of Gov. John Waihee and Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi); see also David L. Callies, "Why would
anyone oppose the $100 million golf-course development fee proposed by Mayor Fasi?'" in THE PRICE OF
PARADISE 169 (Randall Roth ed., 1994).
20 Kirstin Downey, Japanese Investors Turn Interest to Golf Course; "GofFriction'Stirs Fear Fees
Will Become Prohibitive to Americans, WASH. POST, June 2, 1991, at KI.
21 Mak & Sakai, supra note 10, at 36.
22 James Kindall, The Japanese are going Hawaiian; A growing presence on the island, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 4, 1991, at 4 (As a result of foreign investment, in 1991, Hawaii's cost of living and housing prices
were 35% higher than on the mainland. The high cost of living represents the so-called 'paradise tax.');
see also Tong, supra note 17, at h02 (stating that Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi vehemently opposes foreign
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Govemor John Waihee confirmed the existence of political pressure when
he commented, "Hawaii's residents are experiencing a sense of loss ... of
their land to others and, more importantly, loss of control."23 Whether
Hawaii continues to assess foreign developers high impact fees may, in
large part, depend on whether the factors that motivated past high impact
fees assessments are still present in Hawaii.
Nothing in Hawaii suggests that there is no longer a lack of afford-
able housing nor a diminished concern over wide scale foreign investment.
Just as these factors motivated Hawaii's local governments to raise the
specter of high impact fee assessments in the past, these factors may influ-
ence local governments to assess foreign developers high impact fees in the
future. Although, as discussed in the next section, the threat of high impact
fees was not the sole factor discouraging Japanese development, changes in
Hawaii's foreign investor profile may exacerbate the result of high impact
fees assessments on Hawaii's future foreign investors. The next section will
discuss the change from predominately Japanese investment in Hawaii to a
growing Chinese investment presence and the reasons the Chinese are likely
to react differently than the Japanese to the imposition of disproportionately
high impact fee assessments.24
D. International nvestnent in Hawaii
Japanese and Chinese investors constitute a large portion of Hawaii's
international investment. Japanese investment in Hawaii reached its peak in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Chinese investment, however, is just
beginning and probably will continue to grow into the next century.25
Japanese and Chinese investors are distinguishable by their different
motives for investing in Hawaii. Their distinct motives are revealed by
examining the economic and social conditions that spawned these respec-
tive investors. The difference in the investors' motivations explains and
helps predict how each group of investors either has or will respond to
Hawaii's use of impact fees. All investors expect a return on their invest-
purchases of island homes for speculative purposes and that the Mayor has criticized Japanese investors for
"exacerbating" an already tight housing condition); Callies, supra note 19, at 169-70.
23 Mak & Sakai, supra note 10, at 38.
24 See, e-g., Mike Markrich, The morning after: In the shaky aftermath of the revelry of Japanese
buying, new players from the Far East are slowly transforming Hawaii's foreign investment scene, HAWAII
BUSINESS, June 1993, § 1, at 16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASAPII File.
25 Id.
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ments. Impact fees, by nature, diminish the return on a given investment.
As such, the issue is how the expectation of diminished profits affects each
investment group.
1. Japanese Investment
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the desire for profits moti-
vated the Japanese to invest in the United States real estate market.26 The
ability to make these investments resulted from an overvaluation of the
Japanese real estate market.27 The market's overvaluation created equity
that individual investors, under pressure from their bankers, borrowed
against, thereby generating excess capital. 28  The resultant cash-rich
Japanese became the driving force behind Japanese investment in the
United States. 29
Several factors led the Japanese to believe that investing in the United
States meant big profits. First, during the 1980s, the yen nearly doubled in
value as compared to the dollar.30 The strength of the yen made investment
in the United States affordable. Second, Japanese interest rates were rela-
tively low (about five to six percent) as compared to U.S. rates.31 Believing
they could earn more than a six percent return on their U.S. investments, the
Japanese speculatively invested in the United States.32
A considerable percentage of the Japanese investment in the United
States focused on Hawaii, 33 and a large portion of that investment was in
26 The Japanese have invested $76 billion in the U.S. real estate market since the mid-1980s.
Japanese 1991 Investment in U.S. Real Estate Plummets to $5 Billion, Leventhal Study Shows, PR
Newswire, Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASAPII File; see also Japanese Have Not
Abandoned US. Real Estate, According to Study by Kenneth Leventhal & Co., PR Newswire, Nov. 14,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASAPII File.
27 During the late 1980s the value of Tokyo's real estate was 50% higher than its value in the fall of
1993. Robert F. Grondine, Japan's Real Estate Market: Fall from Incredible Heights Forcing Much-
Needed Changes, E. Asian Executive Reports, Aug. 15, 1993, at 9, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
EASIAN File.
28 Conversation with Steve Dickinson, Esq., a partner in Seattle's Garvey, Schubert & Barer. He
was personally involved in Japanese Banking business in the late 1980s.
29 Japanese Have Not Abandoned US. Real Estate, According to Study By Kenneth Leventhal &
Co., supra note 26.3 U Mak & Sakai, supra note 10, at 36.
31 Id.
32 Conversation with Steve Dickinson, Esq., supra note 28.
33 Foreign investment in Hawaii now accounts for over half of the office space in downtown
Honolulu, about two-thirds of Hawaii's hotel rooms, and about 9% of the agricultural property (national
average for foreign owned agricultural property is 1.1%). In 1990, the Japanese accounted for 98% of all
the foreign investment in Hawaii. Mak & Sakai, supra note 10, at 34.
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golf courses.34 Japanese investment in Hawaiian golf courses is under-
standable considering Japan's. domestic golf market. The Japanese have a
love affair with golf but a shortage of available land.35 The shortage of land
for Japanese golf courses caused 1991 Japanese golf course membership
fees to range from $900,000 to $2.7 million.36 Because the cost of golfing
in Japan was too expensive for most golfers, Japanese investors created
Hawaiian golfing vacation packages as a solution.37 Japanese investors
found it profitable to sell international memberships in their Hawaiian-built
golf courses for around $150,000.38
The economic conditions in Japan combined with the large potential
profits from building Hawaiian golf courses rendered Hawaii's use of high
impact fees an acceptable cost of doing business. These considerations
made it possible for Hawaiian governments to charge Japanese developers
higher impact fees. The Japanese did not challenge these impact fees, and
at least one Japanese developer was willing to pay them.
2. Chinese Investment
Chinese investment in Hawaii differs significantly from the preceding
Japanese investment. 39 While Chinese investment in Hawaii is substantial,
ranging as high as $550 million in 1992,40 a few important factors dis-
tinguish Chinese investors from their Japanese counterparts. First, the
domestic economic factors supporting Chinese investment are different than
those that supported the Japanese. Second, the Chinese generally tend to
use different social institutions than the Japanese when investing.
The expansion of mainland China's economy is creating wealth for
Chinese entrepreneurs. 41 According to Zhang Yayun, manager of the
Beijing Rongxin Co., most mainland Chinese investors are self-employed





39 For purposes of this Comment, the term "Chinese investors" includes both mainland Chinese and
Nanyang (overseas) Chinese. The latter term includes ethnic Chinese from the following countries: Korea,
Thailand, Peninsular Malaysia, The Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
40 Markrich, supra note 24, at 16.
41 See HIROYUKI KATO, ECONOMIC REFORM AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: CHINA AND THE PACIFIC
REGION 118-20 (1992) (including Table 8.2 at page 120 showing that per capita income grew most
strongly in Zhejian (up. 52.5%), Guangdong (up 42.2%), Fujian (up 27.4%), Jiangsu (up 25.8%), and
Shandong provinces (up 18.1%)).
FEB. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
businessmen from Beijing, Tianjin, and the provinces of Sichuan and Fujian
and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region.42 When investing in real
estate, the Chinese often use cash from savings to pay for their purchases.43
The Chinese prefer to use cash because many Chinese are wary of their
government's policies on foreign currency conversion, so they seek to
invest their dollar, yen, or deutschmark profits in havens outside the reach
of their government. 44 The Chinese also differ from other investors in that
they rely on wise investments instead of social security or pensions for their
retirement security, so the price and long-term security of their potential
investments are important considerations. 45
In addition to the purely economic differences between Japanese and
Chinese investors, cultural differences indicate that the Chinese will react
differently to Hawaii's impact fees. Unlike Japanese investment in Hawaii
that was facilitated by lending institutions, Chinese investment is facilitated
by the Chinese business family. Understanding the Chinese business family
is central to understanding the overseas Chinese business culture. 46 The
Chinese business family is composed of the immediate family and kinship
relationships, including a broadly defined extended family.47 The primary
benefit derived by the Chinese from the business family is an increased
ability to manage money48 and to make their money work for them.49
Chinese business families have the capacity to move their money through
an extensive network of Pacific Rim Chinese banks.50
When investing in real estate, the Chinese use their business family
connections to insure the profitability of their potential investments. They
call on trusted family, friends, and business associates, including local
lawyers and accountants who reside in the targeted city, to evaluate the
potential investment.5 1 An important factor considered by the Chinese
when investing in a city is the possibility of encountering discrimination or,
42 See Liu Weiling, China: Florida Plots Selling Well, Bus. WEEK, Sept 5, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSWK File (China Daily supplement).
43 Markrich, supra note 24, at 16.
44Id
45 Id (according to Henry Yu, vice president of the Bank of Hawaii's China Marketing Group).
46 MICHAEL GOLDBERG, THE CHINESE CONNECTION: GETTING PLUGGED IN TO PACIFIC RIM REAL
ESTATE, TRADE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 20 (1985) (citing MAURICE FREEDMAN, THE STUDY OF CHINESE
SOCIETY 243 (1979)).
47 Id
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in the extreme, physical violence.52 This fear of discrimination causes the
Chinese to place a premium on hospitable, stable investment opportuni-
ties.53 Their ability to find these opportunities is made possible by their
complex web of family, friends, and business linkages. 54
3. The Difference between Japanese and Chinese Investors
Large impact fee assessments will be a greater deterrence on Chinese
investment than they were on Japanese investment. The principle difference
between Chinese investors and Japanese investors is that unlike the
Japanese whose investment capital was derived from collateralized loans,
Chinese investment capital is derived from cash reserves generated by
China's expanding economy.55 To the Japanese the impact fees represented
an acceptable business cost. However, to the Chinese, high impact fees may
negatively affect their Hawaiian investment because they, unlike the
Japanese, tend to invest using cash reserves. Furthermore, Chinese invest-
ments tend to be long-term in nature rather than short-term speculation.
Beyond purely economic factors, the investors' motives for investing
also distinguish them. The Japanese invested in Hawaii to create a market
for Japanese vacationing golfers, whereas the Chinese are generally
investing in Hawaii to place their wealth outside the reach of the mainland
government or outside the reach of possible discrimination or confiscation.
So, while the Japanese were willing to accept higher costs to realize big
profits, the Chinese who are not investing solely for big profits, may be less
willing to accept additional costs. If Hawaii uses its impact fee statute to
force the Chinese to subsidize Hawaii's affordable housing program, then
the Chinese will likely invest their capital in other markets.
Additionally, the emerging global economy may exacerbate the
Chinese reaction to high impact fee assessments. The emerging global
economy is increasing the ability of financial decision makers to react to
decreased investment returns. The transactions that define the global econ-
omy - money and information on the one hand, and trade and investment
on the other - are merging into one transaction.5 6 Investors who use cur-
rent telecommunications networks, computer networks, and multimedia
52 Id at 30.
53 Id.
54 Id
55 Markrich, supra note 24, at 16.
56 Peter F. Drucker, Trade lessons from the World Economy, FOREIGN Apr., Jan-Feb. 1994, at 99.
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capabilities now have access to large amounts of information. This flow of
information is transforming the standard notions of international econom-
ics57 by diminishing the effect of distances and national borders on
international trade.58 In this climate of international trade, the distinction
between domestic and international policy become less meaningful as
domestic decisions that reduce the profitability of international investment
cause investors to seek other more profitable markets. 59 Consequently,
these emerging economic trends, combined with the Chinese business
family's ability to move capital around the Pacific Rim, will exacerbate any
negative Chinese reaction to high impact fee assessments.
Thus, the Chinese business family exaggerates the effect that
increased information has on international investors. The Chinese business
family not only enhances a Chinese investor's ability to gather information
but it also enhances the investor's ability to financially react to that infor-
mation.60 In the case of Hawaii, the information that high impact fees are
reducing the profitability of real estate investment will likely cause the
Chinese to move their real estate investment elsewhere.
III. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY INEQUITABLE ASSESSMENTS OF IMPACT FEES
Part III first discusses impact fees and the issues that arise in their
application. Section A addresses impact fees, both in general and spe-
cifically in Hawaii. Section B addresses whether foreign nationals have
standing under either the U.S. Constitution or under Hawaii's Constitution
to challenge an impact fee statute. Lastly, section C addresses whether
foreign nationals, asserting a violation of their equal protection rights, could
successfully challenge Hawaii's impact fee statute or an individual impact
fee assessment as violative of their constitutional rights. However, section
C will not address a foreign national's potential takings, taxing, or due
process claims. Rather, section C will only address a foreign national's
potential equal protection claim. The discussion in section C excludes a
foreign national's potential takings, taxing, and due process claims because
such claims would be identical to those of a U.S. national and therefore, a
discussion of these claims would add little to existing scholarship.
57 See, e.g., id (with increased information about potential investment opportunities, influential
decision makers can quickly allocate resources around the world for the best return on their investment).
58 Kenichi Ohmae, Rise of the Region State, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1993, at 78.
59 Drucker, supra note 56, at 104.
60 GOLDBERG, supra note 46, at 19.
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However, before discussing a foreign national's potential claims, a review
of impact fees is useful.
A. Impact Fees
In the United States, reduced federal funding and voter opposition to
increases in the ad valorem property tax are undermining state and local
government's ability to provide basic infrastructure services.
61
Consequently, state and local governments are finding it necessary to shift a
portion of the infrastructure costs to real estate developers.62 To alleviate
the financial burden of building the necessary infrastructure to support new
development, local governments charge developers a proportionate share of
the cost for infrastructure improvements needed to support the developer's
new development.63 Depending on the type of infrastructure improvements
necessitated by the new development, local governments exact compensa-
tion from private developers in .a variety of methods. Local governments
may require a developer to offset the community's cost for infrastructure
improvements by either dedicating land or by paying various fees.
In Hawaii's case, the local government requires developers to offset
the community's development costs by paying impact fees. Local govern-
ments assess impact fees when a new development directly affects the
community's infrastructure and thereby requires the local government to
make infrastructure improvements.64 In this case, the local government will
generally assess an impact fee to pay a proportionate share of the improve-
ment's cost to offset the new development's financial impact on the
community65
1. General Limitations on the Use ofImpact Fees
While state and local governments are generally free to charge impact
fees, the use of impact fees is limited by the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides a general
limitation on the use of impact fees. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the government may not condition the discretionary granting of
61 CALLIES, supra note 6, at 37.
62 Id
63 NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 4, at 2.
64 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 380 (2d ed. 1988).
65 NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 4, at 1; see also MANDELKER, supra note 64, at 380.
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a government benefit upon an applicant's relinquishment of a constitutional
right.66 For example, the government may not require a developer to re-
linquish a right to compensation in exchange for a development permit.
Although the common law has not applied the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions to impact fees, impact fees generally are considered to fall within
the doctrine's scope.67 Therefore, in determining whether an impact fee
statute or an impact fee assessment is valid, the initial step is to determine
whether the statute or the assessment meets the doctrine's requirements.
In the context of impact fees, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions is defined by the essential nexus test as developed in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,68 and in Dolan v. City of Tigard.69 The
essential nexus test is composed of two parts. To satisfy the test's first part
a rational nexus must exist between the government's objective in imposing
the fee and the fee's burden on the developer.70 After finding a rational
nexus, the test's second part is satisfied when it is determined whether the
fee imposed upon the developer is sufficiently related to the development's
impact on the community.7 ' This two part test determines whether a particu-
lar impact fee violates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by
establishing whether an essential nexus exists between the government's
objective in imposing an impact fee and the fee's burden on the developer
The rational nexus test was developed in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.72 The Nollans owned a beach front lot in Ventura County,
California. The Nollans attempted to rebuild the house on the lot and there-
fore applied to the California Coastal Commission, the state agency charged
with coastline development, for the necessary permit. The Commission
granted the Nollans a permit subject to the Nollans granting a public ease-
ment across their lot. The easement requested by the Commission was
bounded on one side by the ocean and on the other by a seawall. The
Commission maintained that such a lateral easement was necessary because
the Nollans' proposed new house would interfere with the public's visual
access to the beach by creating a psychological barrier between the inland
public and the ocean, and that the easement was necessary to alleviate the
66 CALLIES, supra note 6, at 39; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
67 CALLIES, supra note 6, at 39.
68 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
69 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
70 483 U.S. at 837.
71 Id at 838.
72 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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burden imposed by the psychological barrier created by the Nollans' new
house.
The Nollan Court held that the Commission's requirement of a public
easement constituted a taking of property because the mandatory dedication
of a beach front easement running parallel to the waterline did not advance
the legitimate state objective of lowering the psychological barrier created
by the Nollans' new house.73 In short, there was no "essential nexus"
between the mandatory dedication of the easement and the purported state
objective of allowing the public to view the ocean across the Nollans'
land.74 Thus, the rational nexus test requires the local government's
objective in imposing an impact fee to be rationally related to the condition
imposed on the developer.
After establishing a rational nexus, a court must then determine
whether the imposed condition is sufficiently related in nature and extent to
the proposed development's impact on the community.75 This test was set
forth in Dolan v. City of Tigard.76 In Dolan, the Tigard City Planning
Commission conditioned approval of Dolan's plan to expand her plumbing
and electrical supply store upon two preconditions. First, she had to dedi-
cate to the City a portion of her property lying within the 100-year flood
plain to be used for improvements to the storm drainage system along
Fanno Creek. Second, she had to dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of
land running parallel to the flood plain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.77
In first considering whether a rational nexus existed between the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest and the permit condition exacted by the city,
the Dolan Court found that the city's request satisfied the test. Specifically,
the Dolan Court found that an easement dedication for flood control pur-
poses along Fanno Creek and for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway to relieve
traffic congestion in the city's central business district qualified as legiti-
mate government interests.78 Having satisfied the rational nexus test, the
Court then considered the second prong of the unconstitutional conditions
test; whether the degree of exactions bore the required relationship to the
development's projected impact on the local community.
73 Id at 838-842.
74 NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 4, at 5.
75 See, e.g., Dolan v. City ofTigard, 114 S. CL 2309 (1994).
76 Id.
77 Id. at2313.
78 Id. at 2314.
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The Dolan Court found that the exactions demanded by the city
exceeded the required relationship between the condition imposed on the
developer and the development's impact on the community. Examining the
issue, the Court stated that the relationship between the imposed condition
and the development's impact must meet a "rough proportionality" test.79
The Court said the test required no precise mathematical calculation, but
stated "the city must make some sort of individualized determination that
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent" to the proposed
development's impact.80
Applying this requirement, the Court found that the exactions failed
to comport with the newly articulated standard. First, the Court stated that
the city failed to make an individualized determination of why a public
greenway along Fanno Creek was necessary as opposed to a private
greenway, which would preserve the Dolans' property rights while simulta-
neously providing enhanced flood control.81 Second, the Court stated that
the city failed to meet the "rough proportionality" test in its. demand for an
exaction for the pedestrian/bicycle path because the city failed to make
quantified findings to support its conclusion that a pedestrian/bicycle path
easement, "could offset some of the traffic demand and lessen the increase
in traffic congestion," created by the expanded store.82
As a result of Dolan, local and state governments must demonstrate
by an individualized determination that the conditions they impose on
developers are roughly proportional to the new development's projected
impact on the community. In the context of impact fees, local governments
could be required to demonstrate that the funds derived from impact fees
will be applied to infrastructure improvements designed to alleviate the new
development's impact on the community.
In addition to the essential nexus test, some states also require that the
money assessed from developers be spent on improvements to benefit both
the general public and the burdened development.83 Under this require-
ment, an impact fee that provides no substantial benefit to the burdened
development is invalid.8 4
79 Id. at 2319.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2320.
82 Id. at 2321-2.
83 See, e.g., City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).
84 Id.
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The broad purpose of these limitations on impact fees is to ensure that
local governments do not shift the entire cost of expanding the existing
local infrastructure to new developers.85 However, when new developments
require additional infrastructure or facilities, fairness requires that
developers offset some of these costs because by not paying, the developer
would force the local residents to bear the full cost of the required
infrastructure improvements.8 6
2. Hawaiian Impact Fees
Hawaii adopted uniform impact fees when the legislature passed
House Bill 3787.87 Chapter 46, section 143, establishes the authority and
procedures that local governments must follow when assessing impact fees
on new private development. 88 Given that a foreign investor needs to know
the potential costs associated with any planned real estate investment or
development project, this section examines the portion of Hawaii's impact
fee statute that could potentially be used to assess foreign nationals higher
impact fees.
a. Elements of Hawaii's impact fee statute
The Hawaii legislature drafted House Bill 3787 to address three
issues. First, local governments must determine what necessary infrastruc-
ture improvements are attributable to new development so the local
government can maintain an optimum level of services.8 9 Second, local
governments must determine what portion of the infrastructure improve-
ment costs are attributable to new development and what portion are
85 See NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 4, at 1.
86 Id. at 5.
87 d at I.
88 See Appendix A.
89 This question is addressed in subsection (a), which calls for qualified professionals to prepare a
needs-assessment study to help the county: (1) determine standard service levels, (2) determine the facili-
ties needed to maintain the predetermined service levels, (3) determine the types of infrastructure
improvements for which fees shall be imposed, and (4) differentiate between facilities needed to overcome
pre-existing infrastructure deficiencies and facilities needed to accommodate future needs attributable to
new development. In an effort to safeguard the integrity of the needs assessment study, subsection (b)
mandates that the gathered data and conclusions be set forth in a study. NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra
note 4, at 12; see also Appendix A (for text of subsection (a)).
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attributable to pre-existing deficiencies. in infrastructure.90 Third, after
determining the costs for infrastructure improvements attributable to new
development, local governments must determine what portion of those costs
they can pass on to private developers. 9 1 The third issue is the most signifi-
cant of the three because it most directly relates to determining the impact
fee amount to assess developers.
To address the third issue, the statute incorporates seven factors to
ensure that local governments only charge developers a proportionate share
of the cost for new infrastructure. The statute also limits local government's
power to assess impact fees by incorporating the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions.
iL Seven factors limit the amount of infrastructure improvement costs
that local governments can shift to developers
Section 143(d) specifically addresses the question of what portion of
the costs for infrastructure improvements local government can shift to
developers. Subsection (d) requires local governments to ensure that impact
fees are substantially related to the new private development and that the
fees represent a proportionate share of the costs incurred by local govern-
ment in building the new infrastructure. 92 To ensure compliance with its
requirements, subsection (d) also establishes procedures which guide local
governments to ensure that impact fees are proportional and related to the
total costs borne by local government in supporting new development.93
90 The second issue is addressed by subsection (c), which addresses how a local government deter-
mines the cost attributable to each new development. Subsection (c) calls for local governments to base the
impact fee on that portion of the costs incurred by local government in improving the infrastructure attrib-
utable to new development. Additionally, local governments can only assess impact fees so as to offset the
actual or estimated actual costs incurred by the county. Essentially, a county, in determining the amount of
its impact fees, cannot consider the portion of the costs covered by either public finds provided by other
levels of government or by private sources. NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 4, at 12.
91 Id.
92 "An impact fee shall be substantially related to the needs arising from the development and shall
not exceed a proportionate share of the costs incurred or to be incurred by the county in accommodating
the development." HAw. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d) (1993).
93 The following seven factors are considered in determining a proportionate share of public facility
capital improvement costs:
(1) The level of public facility capital improvements required to appropriately serve a develop-
ment, based on a needs assessment study that identifies:
(A) Deficiencies in existing public facilities;
(B) The means, other than impact fees, by which existing deficiencies will be eliminated
within a reasonable period of time; and
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As policy, the seven factors are an attempt to equally distribute the
cost of building new infrastructure between the developers and the existing
residents. Although some commentators feel that the seven factors equita-
bly distribute the burdens associated with infrastructure improvements,94 a
closer reading of the seven factors suggests that they favor the multi-project
developer over the single-project developer. Subsection (d) favors the multi-
project developer because it permits the local government to discount an
impact fee assessment if the developer made past contributions for infra-
structure improvements,95 and also if the developer is likely to make future
contributions for infrastructure improvements within the next twenty
years.96 Consequently, a multi-project developer or even a potential multi-
project developer can probably obtain lower impact fee assessments than
the single-project developer who will most likely not be able to qualify for a
reduced impact fee assessment under subsection (d).
By permitting local governments to consider subsection (d)'s factors,
they can justify assessing a foreign developer higher impact fees than local
developers. Local governments could justify higher. impact fees either on
the grounds that the foreign developer has not contributed to infrastructure
improvements in the last five years, or on the grounds that the foreign
(C) Additional demands anticipated to be placed on specified public facilities by a develop-
ment;
(2) The availability of other funding for public facility capital improvements, including, but not
limited to, user charges, taxes, bonds, intergovernmental transfers, and special taxation or
assessments;
(3) The cost of existing public facility capital improvements;
(4) The methods by which existing public facility capital improvements were financed;
(5) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees has contributed in the previous
five years to the cost of existing public facility capital improvements and received no reasonable
benefit therefrom, and any credits that may be due to a development because of such contribu-
tions;
(6) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees over the next twenty years may
reasonably be anticipated to contribute to the cost of existing public facility capital improve-
ments through user fees, debt service payments, or other payments, and any credits that may
accrue to a development because of future payments; and
(7) The extent to which a developer is required to pay impact fees as a condition precedent to
the development of non-site related public facility capital improvements, and any offsets pay-
able to a developer because of this provision.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d)(l)-(7) (1993).
94 NICHOLAS & DAVIDSON, supra note 4, at 14.
95 HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d)(5) (1993).
96 Id § 46-143(d)(6); see also Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordon City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981)
(discounting for future contributions to the county's capital improvements the county will avoid "double
taxation" of the developer when assessing impact fees).
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developer cannot reasonably anticipate to contribute to infrastructure im-
provements in the next twenty years.
A new domestic developer could avoid being assessed the same
impact fee assessment as a new foreign developer because the new domestic
developer, unlike his foreign counterpart, can argue for lower impact fees
by asserting that he either is a long-time Hawaiian resident or is more likely
to be a future long-time Hawaiian resident, and thereby can reasonably be
anticipated to contribute to future infrastructure improvements. Addition-
ally, United States mainland developers can argue for lower impact fee
assessments by asserting that they, in contrast to their foreign counterparts,
are more likely to have a continuing presence on the islands because they
are insulated from fluctuations in the world's currency markets and from
unpredictable foreign government policies on capital export.
ii. Hawaii's impact fee statute and the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions
Hawaii's impact fee statute incorporates the requirements set forth by
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 97 To ensure that impact fees will
alleviate the impact of a particular development, section 144 provides: (1)
that the collected fees shall be deposited in a development trust fund; (2)
that the county shall geographically define a benefit zone around the
development in which the fees shall be spent; (3) that a needs-assessment
study shall be conducted before the impact fees are collected from the
developer; (4) that the county shall only spend the fees on the type of
facilities for which they were collected; and finally (5) that the county shall
either spend or commit the collected fees within six years of collection.98
Additionally, as specified in section 145, if the county does not spend the
collected fees within six years, then the county is obligated to refund the
impact fee to the developer.99
Although section 144 and 145 might appear to provide the foreign
national with adequate protection against disproportionately high impact
97 Actually, this is the second element in the essential nexus test. See, ag., Dolan v. City of Tigard,
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
98 HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-144 (1993).
99 "If impact fees are not expended or encumbered within the period established in section 46-144,
the county shall refund to the developer or the developer's successor in title the amount of fees paid and
any accrued interest. Application for a refund shall be submitted to the county within one year of the date
on which the right to claim arises. Any unclaimed refund shall be retained in the special trust fund or
interest bearing account and expended as provided in section 46-144." HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-145 (1993).
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fees, in reality, the protection may be illusory. The primary problem with
section 144 is that the protection provided by the section, or lack thereof,
largely depends on how the local government defines the section's terms.
For instance, the protections provided by section 144 will largely depend on
how the local government defines the objectives of the needs-assessment
study, and on how it defines the "benefit zone." As a result of the
limitations of section 144, the statute should be scrutinized in a realistic
factual setting, rather than in the abstract. Moreover, a review of the statute
may indicate how the statute's application would affect foreign developers.
In accounting for Hawaii's political and social reality, the review should
consider whether the statute may inadequately protect foreign developers
from abusive impact fee assessments. If so, the review should also consider
whether a foreign national can challenge either the statute or an individual
impact fee assessment.
There are two legal issues raised when foreign nationals challenge
impact fee statutes on constitutional grounds. The first issue is whether a
foreign national has constitutional standing to challenge an impact fee
statute or an individual impact fee assessment. The second issue, provided
that the foreign national has constitutional standing, is whether a foreign
national may challenge the statute or an individual impact fee assessment on
the grounds that the statute violates his or her equal protection rights.
B. Foreign National Standing to Challenge an Impact Fee Statute
A foreign national developer cannot invoke constitutional protections
in challenging Hawaii's impact fees unless he has constitutional standing.
There are three elements to constitutional standing. First, the foreign
national must present a "case" or "controversy."' 00 Second, he or she must
sustain an "injury in fact."101 The third element is the difficult one, and is
the concern of this section. The constitutional amendment upon which the
foreign national is challenging the government's action, must confer stand-
ing to foreign nationals. In the context of impact fees, the question of
foreign national standing is resolved by analyzing whether the constitutional
100 William W. Dreyfoos, Note, Constitutional Law-Standing to Sue Exclusionary Zoning
Litigation: Catch-22 Revisited, 54 N.C. L. REv. 449, 454 (1976) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197
(1975)Id.
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amendment upon which the foreign national is basing his or her challenge
against the impact fee statute grants standing to foreign nationals.
1. Foreign National Constitutional Standing
A foreign national will probably have standing to challenge Hawaii's
impact fee statute. The Federal Constitution divides the nation's police
power and, therefore, the power to regulate land, between the federal and
state governments. Thus, to challenge a land-use regulation, a foreign
national must determine whether he or she is challenging a state or federal
regulation. The federal government's power to regulate land-uses is limited
by the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.1 02 Hawaii's
power to regulate land-use is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides, "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws," and by Hawaii's Constitution that limits
the state's eminent domain power by providing, "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."I 03 Under
these considerations, to challenge the federal government's power to regu-
late land-uses the foreign national must be entitled to standing under either
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. To challenge Hawaii's power to
regulate land-uses or Hawaii's eminent domain power, the foreign national
must be entitled to standing under the Fourteenth Amendment or under
Hawaii's Constitution. Because Hawaii's impact fee statute is neither an
exercise of the federal government's power to regulate land-uses nor an
exercise of Hawaii's eminent domain power, to challenge Hawaii's impact
fee statute, a foreign national must have standing under either the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause.
a. Fourteenth Amendment standing
A foreign national has standing to challenge the state's power to
regulate land-uses under both the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection Clause when the foreign national is considered
102 "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; see also HAW. CONST. art. I, § 20.
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a "person within the jurisdiction" of the state.104  The Fourteenth
Amendment provides that a foreign riational is a "person within the
jurisdiction" when the foreign national is physically present in the jurisdic-
tion.105 Under this rule any foreign national who is in Hawaii either as a
resident, a visitor, or a landowner can challenge an exercise of the Hawaiian
government's police power by alleging either a violation of his or her due
process or equal protection rights. When either the federal or state govern-
ment exercises power outside the immigration context, Constitutional
guarantees protect resident foreign nationals and citizens alike.106
However, despite the fact that foreign nationals within the jurisdiction have
standing to challenge a government's power to regulate land-uses, it is
unclear whether foreign nationals outside the jurisdiction are accorded the
same protection.
i. Fourteenth Amendment standing for non-resident foreign nationals
No court has indicated in unequivocal terms whether a state is
required to give Fourteenth Amendment due process protections to a non-
resident property-owning foreign national.107 However, despite the lack of
definitive holdings, Senior District Judge Van Pelt discussed the issue in his
dissent in Shames v. Nebraska. 108 In Shames, a deceased resident foreign
national devised his estate to four non-resident foreign national heirs.
Under Nebraska statutes, non-resident foreign nationals were prevented
from acquiring a fee simple absolute title to land. Therefore the heirs were
denied their inheritance and the property escheated to the state. In response,
104 See, eg., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that the provision, "Nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" is universal in its appli-
cation to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or
of nationality); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating
that aliens within the United States enjoy the benefits of the first, fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments).
105 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that
Fourteenth Amendment protections extend to aliens without distinguishing between those who are [in the
U.S.] legally or illegally, or between residents and visitors).
101 Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 4 WIS. L. REV. 965, 989 (1993)
(citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 nn.9-10 (1952)).
107 See, e.g., Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1971). It should be noted that
a non-resident foreign national can easily avoid this problem by incorporating an investment company in
Hawaii, thus qualifying for resident status. Additionally, it should be noted that even though this section
and Shames refer to non-resident "property-owning" foreign nationals, there is no material distinction
between the non-resident "property-owning" foreign national in Shames and the non-resident foreign
national that is the subject of this Comment.
108 323 F. Supp. 1321 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the heirs filed a suit charging, inter alia, that they were deprived of their
property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 109 The majority never reached the question of whether the statute
depriving a non-resident foreign national of his property violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the court held that under Nebraska
statutes, the heirs never owned property in the first place. Therefore,
because the heirs could not be deprived of property they never owned, the
state's absolute bar of ownership of land by non-resident aliens did not
violate their due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. 110
However, in his dissent, Senior District Judge Van Pelt squarely
addressed the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause grants standing to a non-resident foreign national. He stated that the
Nebraska statute violated the heirs' due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.111 In distinguishing the fact that the Equal Protection Clause
protects only those persons within the state's jurisdiction, Judge Van Pelt
noted the Due Process Clause contains no comparable words of limitation;
As I read the due process clause[sic], it applies to any person,
regardless of whether that person resides within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, if that person can show some
deprivation of life, liberty, or property within the territorial
jurisdiction sufficient to give the judiciary power to act. No
words of qualification or limitation appear. I submit that, for
purposes of standing, there is no logical basis for asserting that
the words do not mean precisely what they say, and therefore a
non-resident, friendly alien alleging a deprivation of his prop-
erty which is located within the territorial boundaries of this
country would have standing to raise the due process argu-
ment.11 2
Additionally, Judge Van Pelt argued that this country's economic position is
due in part to European investors who placed their funds at risk in this
country's development, because they rightly believed they were protected
by constitutional guarantees.113
109 ld. at 1333.
110 Id. at 1335.
111 Id. at 1337-8.
112 Id. at 1338.
113 Id. at 1339.
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Three years after the federal district court's ruling, the case came
before the Nebraska Supreme Court. Although the Nebraska Supreme
Court's opinion did not directly support Judge Van Pelt's dissent, it was
arguably influenced by it as the court reached the same result as Judge Van
Pelt but on different grounds. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that it was
unnecessary to reach the Fourteenth Amendment's due process question,
because the statutorily proscribed method by which non-resident aliens may
be deprived of their inheritance was mistakenly read so as to preclude non-
resident aliens from just compensation. 114 The court concluded that
because the statute provides compensation to the non-resident aliens, it
satisfies the demands of due process under any interpretation)'15
b. Equal protection standing
A foreign national has standing under the Equal Protection Clause so
long as the foreign national is considered a person within the jurisdiction.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a foreign national is a "person within the
jurisdiction" when the foreign national is physically present in the jurisdic-
tion.116 Under this standard, any foreign national who is in Hawaii either as
a resident, a landowner, or even a visitor, has standing under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
A company incorporated in Hawaii is also protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 117 The U.S. Supreme
Court held that corporations doing business within a state are "persons
within the jurisdiction" and are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.118
To summarize the issue of foreign national standing, the resident
foreign national developer has standing to challenge the state's power to
regulate land-uses under both the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection Clause. However, if the foreign national is not
a resident of Hawaii and therefore is considered to be outside the jurisdic-
tion, then the non-resident foreign national probably has standing to
challenge an impact fee statute under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause but not under the Equal Protection Clause. If a developer
114 Shames v. Nebraska, 223 N.W.2d 481,483 (Neb. 1974).
115 Id.
116 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
117 See, e.g., Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421 (1921).
118 1d
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has standing he or she may therefore be able to successfully challenge
Hawaii's impact fee statute on the basis that the statute violates the devel-
oper's equal protection rights.
2. Constitutionality of Hawaii's Impact Fee Statute
An impact fee statute can be unconstitutional either on its face as
drafted, or as applied in a given situation. This section first discusses
whether Hawaii's impact fee statute comports with constitutional require-
ments as drafted. Then it examines whether statutorily authorized impact
fee assessments similar in nature to the proposed $100 million golf course
impact fee are constitutionally valid when such assessments disproportion-
ately impact foreign nationals. In discussing individual impact fee
assessments, this section assumes that the historical- factors that influenced
Hawaii's past use of impact fees will be present and influencing Hawaii's
future use of impact fees. Thus, the $100 million golf course impact fee and
the factors behind the assessment may help to predict whether such dispro-
portionately high impact fee assessments will occur in the future and
whether such assessments are susceptible to a constitutional challenge.
a. Constitutionality of Hawaii's impact fee statute as drafted
A land-use statute is constitutionally valid as drafted when it meets
four federal constitutional criteria. The statute cannot violate either the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection or Due Process clauses.
Additionally, the statute cannot violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause. Finally, the statute cannot violate article I section (8) of the
Constitution by administratively imposing a tax in the guise of a fee.
Of the four criteria, the equal protection question is most important to
foreign nationals. The remaining three constitutional questions apply to all
developers, and are, therefore, not unique to foreign nationals. However,.
the equal protection question is unique to foreign nationals because deter-
mining impact fees based primarily on national origin impermissibly
discriminates against foreign developers and thereby probably violates the
foreign developer's equal protection rights.
An equal protection claim against Hawaii's impact fee statute is
likely to succeed in federal court if the foreign developer claims that the
statute discriminates between developers on the basis of race or national
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origin.' 19 A substantiated racial discrimination claim will cause a court to
review Hawaii's statute under the strict scrutiny review standard.120 To
trigger strict scrutiny review, the developer must show that the statute is
discriminatory in nature by showing that the statute furthers a
discriminatory intent. 121
If the statute's language furthers a discriminatory legislative intent,
then the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 122 A court finds a discriminatory intent either from the statute's
text or constructively from considering the following factors: (1) when there
is a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes; (2) when there is
a departure from the normal procedural sequence; (3) when factors usually
considered important by the decision maker strongly favor a contrary deci-
sion; or (4) when there are contemporaneous statements by members of the
decision making body. 123 A foreign national may also succeed in showing a
constructive discriminatory intent because the statute permits local govem-
ments to assess higher impact fees to foreign developers who cannot
demonstrate they will continue to support local infrastructure through
development fees and other payments over the next twenty years. 124 How-
ever, it is questionable whether such a showing would amount to
demonstrating a discriminatory legislative intent.
To counter the foreign developer's assertion, the state, in accordance
with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 125 may justify the statute's
distinction between developers by arguing that charging one time develop-
119 MANDELKER, supra note 64, at 287.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252. 264-65
(1977b22 Id. (holding that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause).
123 Id. at 264-69.
124 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d)(5)-(6) (1993):
(5) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees has contributed in the previous
five years to the cost of existing public facility capital improvements and received no reasonable
benefit therefrom, and any credits that may be due to a development because of such contribu-
tions;
(6) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees over the next twenty years may
reasonably be anticipated to contribute to the cost of existing public facility capital improve-
ments through user fees, debt service payments, or other payments, and any credits that may
accrue to a development because of future payments...
125 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (stating that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike unless the
distinguishing classification drawn by a statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
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ers higher rates is in the state's legitimate interest because such a distinction
is fundamentally fair. The state could potentially justify the statute's
language, which permits charging foreign developers higher impact fees by
claiming any distinction made by the statute's language between local
developers and foreign developers is merely secondary to the state's legiti-
mate interests in distinguishing between multi-project developers and one-
time developers. The rationale is that multi-project developers, unlike one-
time developers, generally pay future special assessments, debt service
payments, and other payments in addition to impact fees. 126 By charging
the same impact fee rate to both one time developers and developers of
many projects, the local government, in effect, would be subjecting multi-
project developers to double taxation. 127 In reviewing the legislative record
and the wording of the statute, there are no facts, other than the potential
higher assessment rate to one time developers, that indicates a statutory dis-
criminatory intent. 128 Therefore, as the statute is drafted, Hawaii's impact
fee statute probably does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.
b. Constitutionality of impact fee statute as applied
A foreign developer may challenge an individual impact fee assess-
ment under one of three following bases: (1) as an uncompensated
regulatory taking of property; (2) as a violation of the municipality's taxing
authority; or (3) as an impermissible discriminatory action against foreign
developers. However, as noted in the previous section, this section will
focus on how a foreign national can challenge a disproportionately high
impact fee assessment as violative of his or her Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection rights. After addressing the burdens and standards of
proof, the section discusses, in the context of Hawaii's $100 million golf
course impact fee, the possible arguments that each side could advance to
either challenge an impact fee assessment or to support an impact fee
assessment.
126 See Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981) (stating that by dis-
counting for future contributions to the county's capital improvements the county will avoid "double
taxation" of the developer when assessing impact fees).
127 Id
128 The U.S. Supreme Court found that corporations doing business within a state are "persons
within the jurisdiction" and are protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421 (1921).
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To challenge a specific impact fee assessment, the initial burden of
proof falls upon the foreign developer. A foreign developer must show that
the assessment was motivated by a discriminatory intent.129 Showing that
an impact fee assessment was motivated by a discriminatory intent triggers
strict scrutiny judicial review of the assessment. 130 Once strict scrutiny
judicial review is triggered, the burden shifts to the local government to
justify its impact fee assessment. 131 Local government meets its burden of
proof by showing that the particular assessment furthers a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 132 However, to meet their burdens of proof, each side
must meet the minimum standard of proof to support their assertions.
To meet the standard of proof, the challenging foreign developer must
show that the impact fee assessment was motivated by a discriminatory
intent.133 In considering a foreign developer's claim, a court will consider
the developer's claim under the test set forth in Village ofArlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 134 Under this test, a court
may consider, as one of several factors, whether such assessments evidence
a discriminatory intent by disproportionately impact foreign developers. 135
Additionally, a court may consider the following factors: (1) whether there
is a departure from the normal procedural sequence; (2) whether factors
usually considered important by the decision maker strongly favor a
decision contrary to the one reached; and (3) whether there are
contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body
evidencing a discriminatory intent. 136 After considering these factors, if the
court finds sufficient evidence that the assessment was motivated by a
discriminatory intent, then the local government must show why such an
assessment is justified.
In evaluating whether disproportionately high impact fee assessments
are valid under Hawaii's House Bill 3787, one should also consider
Hawaii's political and social pressures. If considered, such pressures could
support the foreign national's position by indicating that such assessments
were based on factors other than those normally considered by the decision
maker.
129 MANDELKER, supra note 64, at 287.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 290.
132 Id
133 See, e-g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264-5 (1977).
134 Id.; see also MANDELKER, supra note 64, at 287.
135 See also MANDELKER, supra note 64, at 287.
136 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264-69 (1977).
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Hawaii's $100 million golf course impact fee provides an example of
how these pressure might affect a decision maker. As noted earlier, the
$100 million golf course impact fee was proposed at a time when virtually
all the developers applying for golf course development permits were
Japanese and when prior to the proposed $100 million impact fee, the fee
ranged around several million dollars.137 In addition to disproportionately
affecting foreign nationals, Hawaii's $100 million golf course impact fee
probably was motivated by local political and social pressures. Thus, if a
foreign national developer challenges a future impact fee assessment, which
is similar in nature to Hawaii's $100 million golf course impact fee, then the
foreign national should be able to cite to the golf course impact fee to
support his or her position that the challenged impact fee assessment is
discriminatory,
C. Evaluating Whether a Foreign National Can Successfully Challenge
an Impact Fee Assessment Authorized Under House Bill 3787
A foreign developer can probably successfully challenge a dispropor-
tionately high impact fee assessment as authorized by House Bill 3787 on
the grounds that such an assessment violates his or her equal protection
rights. Foreign developers should be able to successfully argue that
assessing foreign developers disproportionately high impact fee rates
impermissibly discriminates against them on the basis of national origin and
thereby triggers strict scrutiny review of the impact fee assessment.
The foreign developer can sustain such a claim by meeting his or her
burden of proof by showing that an impact fee assessment was based on a
discriminatory intent. To show that the assessment was based on a
discriminatory intent, the foreign developer can argue that three of the five
factors set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. are met.138 First, the foreign developer can argue that
such assessments disproportionately burden foreign developers because
they are unable to equally qualify for reduced assessments. Second, the
foreign developer can argue that such assessments depart from the normal
procedural sequence because such assessments exceed the amounts gener-
ally assessable under the procedures established by section 143(d)'s seven
137 See supra notes 6-24 and accompanying text.
138 429 U.S. 252,264-65 (1977); see also MANDELKER, supra note 64, at 287.
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factors. 139 Finally, the foreign developer can demonstrate the statute's
discriminatory impact by showing that the statute's provisions for reducing
an assessment, which are based on whether a developer has contributed in
the last five years or will likely contribute during the next twenty years,
effectively precludes a foreign developer from successfully seeking a
reduction in impact fee assessments. 140
The state, however, can counter by justifying that the distinction
drawn between local and foreign developers furthers a compelling govern-
mental interest.141 Under City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
regulations distinguishing between persons similarly situated do not violate
the Equal Protection Clause if the state can demonstrate that the distinction
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 142 The state can argue that
assessing one time developers higher impact fees is fundamentally fair
because without such a distinction, multi-project developers, unlike one-
time developers, pay twice for the same services when they pay future
special assessments, debt service payments, or other payments in addition to
impact fees. 143 However persuasive this argument might seem, it will likely
fail to justify a $80 million assessment differential between developers as
occurred in the case of golf course assessments. 144 As such, if Hawaii
makes similar assessments in the future then these assessments will likely
be subject to judicial strict scrutiny and held to violate the foreign develop-
ers equal protection rights.
In addition to possibly violating a foreign national's equal protection
rights, Hawaii's impact fee statute may be susceptible to the other legal
challenges listed at the beginning of this section. The probability that an
impact fee assessment authorized by House Bill 3787 will violate a foreign
developer's equal protection rights will be greatly increased if Hawaii con-
tinues to use impact fees to pay for affordable housing and as a means of
controlling foreign investment.
139 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68
(1977?40 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-143(d) (1993).
141 MANDELKER, supra note 64, at 287.
142 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (stating that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike unless the
distinguishing classification drawn by a statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
143 See, e.g., Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordon City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
144 See supra notes 6-24 and accompanying text.
FE13.1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
IV. CONCLUSION
Hawaii should not assess foreign developers higher impact fees than
their similarly situated local counterparts. The problem is that Hawaii's
impact fee statute does not preclude Hawaii's local governments from
assessing foreign developers disproportionately high impact fees, just as
they did before the statute's enactment. Two factors suggest that local
governments are under pressures to make such assessments. First, Hawaii
still has a shortage of affordable housing. Second, there is still local resis-
tance to foreign investment and investors. Under these conditions, it is
likely Hawaiian governments will assess foreign developers higher impact
fees than their local counterparts.
Assessing foreign developers higher impact fees than local develop-
ers will deprive Hawaii of investment revenue. Therefore, such assessments
are bad policy. Disproportionately high impact fees, like the $100 million
golf course impact fee, dissuade or chill foreign investment by diminishing
the investor's potential return. This "chilling effect" on Hawaiian foreign
investment will be exacerbated in the future as the number of prospective
Chinese investors wishing to invest in Hawaii grows, but who, due to
Hawaii's potentially high impact fees, decided to invest elsewhere.
Assessing foreign developers high impact fees is also susceptible to a
number of legal challenges. First, assessing foreign developers high impact
fees will likely violate a foreign developer's equal protection rights.
Realistically, an $80 million difference in impact fee assessments between
developers cannot be justified under a compelling government interest.
This is especially true when one considers that such a fee is being assessed
to alleviate the financial impact on the community from only one develop-
ment. Without a compelling government interest, such an assessment
violates the developer's equal protection rights. Additionally, an impact fee
may be challenged as an uncompensated regulatory taking of property, as a
violation of the municipality's taxing authority, or as an impermissible
discriminatory action against foreign developers. Disproportionately high
impact fee assessments will be susceptible to these other legal challenges.
Emerging trends in the global economy also support the position that
Hawaii should not assess foreign developers high impact fees. Any nega-
tive effects from Hawaii assessing foreign developers high impact fees will
be compounded by international investors' increased access to information,
which increases their ability to transfer capital between markets. Thus,
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because of these emerging international investment trends, Hawaii could
potentially lose foreign investment as a result of assessing foreign develop-
ers disproportionately high impact fees.
To conclude, there are three reasons why Hawaii's local governments
should not assess foreign developers disproportionately higher impact fees
than their local counterparts. First, such assessments are probably unconsti-
tutional. Second, due to the emerging trends in the global economy, such
assessments will generally dissuade foreign investment. Finally, due to the
nature of Chinese investment, such assessments will probably cause the
Chinese, Hawaii's prospective new investors, to invest their capital in other
markets.
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Appendix A
DIVISION 5. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
TITLE 6. COUNTY ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
SUBTITLE 1. PROVISIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTIES
CHAPTER 46. GENERAL PROVISIONS
[PART VIII.] IMPACT FEES
HRS @46-143 (1993)
Impact fee calculation
(a) A county council considering the enactment of impact fees shall first
approve a needs assessment study that shall identify the kinds of public
facilities for which the fees shall be imposed. The study shall be prepared
by an engineer, architect, or other qualified professional and shall identify
service standard levels, project public facility capital improvement needs,
and differentiate between existing and future needs.
(b) The data sources and methodology upon which needs assessments
and impact fees are based shall be set forth in the needs assessment study.
(c) The pro rata amount of each impact fee shall be based upon the
development and actual capital cost of public facility expansion, or a
reasonable estimate thereof, to be incurred by the county.
(d) An impact fee shall be substantially related to the needs arising from
the development and shall not exceed a proportionate share of the costs
incurred or to be incurred by the county in accommodating the develop-
ment. The following seven factors shall be considered in determining a
proportionate share of public facility capital improvement costs:
(1) The level of public facility capital improvements required to
appropriately serve a development, based on a needs assessment study that
identifies:
(A) Deficiencies in existing public facilities;
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(B) The means, other than impact fees, by which existing
deficiencies will be eliminated within a reasonable period of time; and
(C) Additional demands anticipated to be placed on specified
public facilities by a development;
(2) The availability of other funding for public facility capital
improvements, including, but not limited to, user charges, taxes, bonds,
intergovernmental transfers, and special taxation or assessments;
(3) The cost of existing public facility capital improvements;
(4) The methods by which existing public facility capital improve-
ments were financed;
(5) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees has
contributed in the previous five years to the cost of existing public facility
capital improvements and received no reasonable benefit therefrom, and any
credits that may be due to a development because of such contributions;
(6) The extent to which a developer required to pay impact fees over
the next twenty years may reasonably be anticipated to contribute to the cost
of existing public facility capital improvements through user fees, debt
service payments, or other payments, and any credits that may accrue to a
development because of future payments; and
(7) The extent to which a developer is required to pay impact fees as a
condition precedent to the development of non-site related public facility
capital improvements, and any offsets payable to a developer because of
this provision.
(e) The impact fee ordinance shall contain a provision setting forth the
process by which a developer may contest the amount of the impact fee
assessed.
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